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When external capital markets are stressed they may not reallocate resources between firms. We show
that resource allocation within firms' internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing
financial market dislocation. Using data on US conglomerates we empirically verify that firms shift
resources between industries in response to shocks to the financial sector. We estimate a structural
model of internal capital market to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation
decision and how these forces interact with external capital market stress. The frictions in internal
capital markets drive a large wedge between productivity and investment: the weaker (stronger) division
obtains too much (little) capital, as though it is 12 (9) percent more (less) productive than it really
is. The cost of accessing external capital funds quadruple during extreme financial market dislocations,
making resource allocation within firms significantly cheaper. The estimated model allows us to simulate
the propagation of the 2007/2008 financial market dislocation. The counterfactual out of sample simulated
data is remarkably consistent with the actual data and shows that improved resource allocation in internal
capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16% to 30% relative
to firms with no internal capital markets.
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Do ￿rm boundaries mediate the e⁄ect of shocks to the ￿nancial intermediation sector? When the
functioning of the intermediation sector is impaired ￿as was the case in the recent ￿nancial crisis
￿shocks can be transmitted to the broader economy since funds may not ￿ ow to highest value use
without incurring signi￿cant cost. This issue has been extensively explored in the credit channel
literature (e.g., Kashyap and Stein [2000]; Bernanke and Blinder [1988; 1992] and Bernanke and
Gertler [1995]). However, unlike what is assumed in this literature, ￿rms may be able to reallocate
resources internally ￿ for instance, between divisions in di⁄erent industries ￿ to ameliorate the
e⁄ect of ￿nancial shocks. If so, external credit market conditions will impact the nature of resource
allocation inside ￿rms and between industries di⁄erently than they would in an economy with no
internal capital markets. Diversi￿ed ￿rms constitute a large part of economies around the world,1
therefore resource allocation within ￿rms can be of signi￿cant importance in determining macro
outcomes such as business cycle ￿ uctuations, total factor productivity and growth (eg. Bloom
[2009]). In this paper we propose and empirically verify that ￿rms shift resources between industries
in response to shocks to the ￿nancial sector. We then estimate a structural model to quantify the
forces driving this reallocation decision, and show that these forces dampen shocks to the ￿nancial
sector in economically signi￿cant ways.2
We study the resource allocation problem in a sample of diversi￿ed ￿rms in the U.S. Economists
have used these ￿rms as a laboratory for studying resource allocation decisions inside ￿rms. There
are two prevailing views on how capital is internally allocated in these ￿rms. Alchian [1969] and
Stein [1997], among others, have put forth the view that conglomerates may outperform external
capital markets by virtue of exerting centralized control over the capital allocation process (￿ bright
side￿view). This view has been challenged by several studies, such as Rajan, Servaes and Zingales
[2000] and Scharfstein and Stein [2000] who argue that resource allocation inside ￿rms is distorted
towards weaker divisions by managerial socialistic concerns (￿ dark side￿view). We propose and es-
timate a model with a dynamic tradeo⁄ between the ￿ bright￿and the ￿ dark￿side of internal capital
markets. In our setting, the cost of conglomerates arises from managerial preferences for corporate
socialism. The bene￿t is that funds can be allocated between divisions without experiencing fric-
tions of accessing external capital markets. The cost of accessing external capital markets vary over
time introducing a time varying wedge between the cost and bene￿t of internal capital markets.
We ￿rst present reduced form evidence that motivate the economic forces in our structural
model using data of diversi￿ed ￿rms in the US from 1980 to 2006. We show that conglomerates￿
performance relative to stand-alone ￿rms improves during times in which external capital markets
are impaired. Moreover, during these periods, conglomerates with more productivity dispersion
among their divisions perform relatively better. Figure 1 plots the value of conglomerates with high
1The Bureau of the Census reports that multi-industry ￿rms account for about half of the sales in the U.S in 2008.
2To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to estimate a structural model of capital allocation within conglomerates.
For other structural models with credit market frictions see Einav, Jenkins and Levin [2010], Whited [2006], and Bloom
[2009].
1productivity dispersion relative to the value of conglomerates with low productivity dispersion. It
shows that the di⁄erence in these values narrows with an increase in the TED spread, our measure
of external capital market distress. We also show that these valuation results are correlated with
changes in capital allocation across divisions. These facts suggest that ￿rms with high productivity
dispersion among their divisions shift resources between industries in response to shocks to the
￿nancial sector.
This reduced form evidence allows us to track only the net bene￿t or cost of resource allocation
inside the ￿rm. However, our goal is to identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation
and how these forces change as the external capital markets change. These quantities are di¢ cult
to disentangle from the "net" estimates in reduced form. We are also interested in quantifying how
much of the dislocation in external capital markets is ameliorated by reallocation in internal capital
markets. This is di¢ cult to study in reduced form because the crisis data are frequently subject
to other shocks, such as declining productivity and government intervention. The structural model
allows us to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision. We can
then conduct counterfactuals in which ￿rms are exposed only to shocks in external capital markets
and study how capital reallocates within ￿rms.
The structural model we use is a variant of an investment model with costly external ￿nancing
such as Whited [2006], with three novel features. First, a ￿rm comprises several divisions, which
di⁄er in productivity. The ￿nancing and investment decisions, however, are taken at the head-
quarters level, which is optimizing across all divisions. Second, the manager of the conglomerate
has preferences for corporate socialism, where the headquarters gain some utility from minimizing
the diversity in pro￿ts among divisions. Our motivation follows directly from the work of Rajan,
Servaes and Zingales [2000] and Scharfstein and Stein [2000] who present models that micro-found
managerial socialism. Third, we allow the cost of accessing external capital markets to be time
varying. These three features capture the dynamic tradeo⁄ posited earlier. The structural model
uses investment, ￿nancing and cash stock decisions taken within the diversi￿ed ￿rm to estimate
the parameters of corporate socialism and time varying cost of external ￿nancing.
We use the two step estimator developed in Bajari, Benkard and Levin [2007] (BBL) to estimate
the parameters of our problem. A major source of identi￿cation in our model is the division
investment response to its own productivity and the productivity of other divisions. If productivity
is mis-measured in a systematic way our estimates will be biased (see Gomes [2001], Whited [2001],
Chevalier [2004], Villalonga [2004] and Gomes and Livdan [2004]). In Section V.C.2 we discuss
the criteria that the measurement error would have to satisfy in order to generate our results, and
argue that such measurement error is highly implausible. Nevertheless, we account for potential
bias in measured productivity using an oil price based shifter of dispersion in productivity across
divisions of a conglomerate. Intuitively, we exploit variation in industry productivity driven by oil
prices which generates an instrument for productivity dispersion among divisions. Since divisions
comprising conglomerates are exposed to oil prices in di⁄erent ways, a change in oil prices will
di⁄erentially change divisions￿productivity, changing the productivity dispersion in a conglomerate
2exogenously. It is this variation that identi￿es the parameters of our model.
A central result from our structural model is an estimate of preferences for corporate socialism,
which allows us to quantify the frictions in internal capital markets. This uniquely di⁄erentiates our
paper from the existing literature on conglomerates. Our estimate of "dark" side of conglomerates
is economically large and suggests signi￿cant corporate socialism inside diversi￿ed ￿rms. Managers
allocate too little capital to the strong division: an average two division conglomerate behaves
as though the stronger division￿ s productivity is 9 percentage points lower than it actually is.
Conversely, managers allocate too much capital to the weaker division, treating it as though it is 12
percentage points more productive than it really is. This tilt is even larger in conglomerates with
more dispersed productivity among its divisions. In absence of external capital market frictions,
these estimates reveal the large advantage of stand-alone ￿rms over conglomerates.
Our estimates of the ￿ bright￿ side of internal capital markets are driven by the ability to
reallocate resources between divisions without incurring the cost of raising funds in external capital
markets. For example, the estimates suggest that conglomerates on average face lower cost of
￿nancing due to ￿winner picking￿as in Stein [2003]. In extreme cases this can reduce the cost of
borrowing for the diversi￿ed ￿rm by a signi￿cant amount (about 6.8 percent in absolute terms).
This average cost conceals an important fact that there is substantial variation in the cost of external
￿nancing over time. We ￿nd a strong non-linearity in the e⁄ect of time varying external capital
market conditions suggesting a larger impact when there are episodes of extreme ￿nancial market
dislocation. There is little change in accessing external capital markets for values of the TED
spread, our proxy for external market dislocation, below 1 percent.3 However, as TED increases
to 1.5 percent the ￿nancing cost increases by almost 50 percent and is over 250 percent higher at
TED of 2 percent. During these times of extreme ￿nancial market stress the ability to reallocate
resources between divisions is valuable and potentially allows diversi￿ed ￿rms to mediate the e⁄ect
of ￿nancial shocks.
We next explore how shocks to the ￿nancial sector are mediated by resource allocation inside
diversi￿ed ￿rms using our estimated model. We use the recent ￿nancial crisis of 2007/2008 to
simulate the disruption in the supply of ￿nancial capital and study how these shocks are propagated
di⁄erentially through stand-alones and conglomerates. This allows us to examine the consequences
of the credit shock on ￿rm value and how this change in value is related to the allocation of resources
within ￿rms.
We start with our model, which is estimated on the period from 1980 to 2006, and expose the
￿rms in the sample to capital market conditions from 2007 to 2010. We forward simulate, assuming
that the only change from the pre-crisis period was an increase in the cost of accessing external
capital markets re￿ ected in an increase in the TED spread. Using this simulated data, we ￿nd
that the di⁄erence in value of conglomerates relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone ￿rms
decreases as TED spikes in 2008, but increases when TED drops in 2009 and 2010. In other words,
3The TED spread is the di⁄erence between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government
T-bills. It is used as a conventional gauge of credit risk since it measures the di⁄erence between an unsecured deposit
rate and the rate on a government backed obligation (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin [2008]).
3as external market conditions tighten, conglomerates become more valuable relative to stand-alone
￿rms and as the ￿nancial markets normalize, the pattern reverses.
We also show that the source of this increase in relative value of conglomerates is the ability
to reallocate resources between their divisions. In particular, we ￿nd that in non-crisis periods
investment of conglomerate ￿rms is less sensitive to productivity than that of stand-alone ￿rms.
However, as TED increases in 2008, this wedge decreases: conglomerates are able to shift more
internal funds among divisions, but stand-alone ￿rms are precluded from raising ￿nancing from the
market.
Remarkably, even though this data is simulated out of sample and ignores any e⁄ect of the
crisis on productivity or government intervention, we show that these patterns are consistent with
those found in actual data of diversi￿ed ￿rms between 2007-2009. We ￿nd that factors other
than increased frictions in external capital markets explain up to 30% of the change in relative
valuation of conglomerates during this period. Examining reduced form conglomerate valuations
would therefore signi￿cantly overstate the extent to which capital reallocation within ￿rms mediates
the e⁄ect of ￿nancial shocks. The counterfactual exercise shows that an increase in ￿nancial markets
stress during the crisis was ameliorated in diversi￿ed ￿rms through more e¢ cient resource allocation
by 16% to 30%.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. This paper is clearly related to prior studies
that examine the costs and bene￿ts of conglomeration. On theoretical front while Stein [1997]
among others argues that active internal capital markets in diversi￿ed ￿rms have bene￿ts, several
papers including Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000] and Scharfstein and Stein [2000] discuss the
costs associated with this organizational form. Our results on resource allocation inside diversi￿ed
￿rms is also related to the capital-allocation centric point of view on the boundaries of the ￿rm
(e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein [1998]; Holmstrom and Kaplan [2001] and Almeida, Campello and
Hackbarth [2011]).
The empirical reduced form evidence on diversi￿ed ￿rms identi￿es the net cost or bene￿t of
conglomerates (e.g., Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000], Maksimovic and Phillips [2002], Ozbas
and Scharfstein [2010], Seru [2010]), or examines productivity di⁄erences (e.g., Maksimovic and
Phillips [2002] and Schoar [2002]) across organizational forms to draw inferences about resource
allocation.4 Gomes and Livdan [2004] study a quantitative model of conglomerates. They use their
model to argue that the decision to become a conglomerate could explain the measured relationship
between investment, valuation and Q between conglomerates and stand-alone ￿rms. Instead of
looking at whether a ￿rm becomes a conglomerate, we take the structure of conglomerates as
given. Our focus is how resource allocation decisions vary among conglomerates with di⁄erences in
productivity dispersion and how this relationship is related to external capital markets. Moreover,
instead of a model with no agency frictions, our model explicitly allows for corporate socialism,
which we estimate to be quantitatively large. Maksimovic and Phillips [2008] exploit demand shocks
4A more complete treatment on the extensive literature on conglomerates is available in Stein [2003] and Maksi-
movic and Phillips [2007].
4in the real sector to show that conglomerates alleviate ￿nancial constraints in acquisitions and plant
openings in growth industries. Instead, our focus is in understanding how internal capital markets
adjust to shocks in the ￿nancial sector and quantifying these e⁄ects. In doing so, this paper is the
￿rst to decompose the costs and bene￿ts of conglomerates and examines how the tradeo⁄ between
these forces changes with condition of external capital markets.
Our work is also related to structural models of credit market imperfections. Adams, Einav
and Levin [2009] analyze frictions arising from adverse selection in the consumer credit markets
focusing on shocks to liquidity while Einav, Jenkins and Levin [2010] focus on contract pricing
and how it can be analyzed using estimates of consumer demand. Whited [2006] and Riddick
and Whited [2009] study ￿rms￿decisions to accumulate cash in a dynamic investment model with
external ￿nancing constraints, holding conditions in external capital markets ￿xed. Eisfeldt and
Rampini [2008] calibrate a model of capital reallocation across the business cycle. We extend this
work by showing that the impact of credit market imperfections on investment may be dampened
due to reallocation of resources within some ￿rms in the economy.
Finally, our paper is broadly related to literature that relates macroeconomic shocks to growth.
For instance, Bloom [2009] analyzes the e⁄ect of uncertainty on changes in aggregate output. Our
work relates the shocks in the ￿nancial sector to resource allocation inside ￿rms which can in turn
shape the path of total factor productivity and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. In Section III
we present some reduced form evidence that motivates our theory. Section IV presents the while
Section V discusses the estimator. Section VI discuss our ￿ndings while Section VII presents coun-
terfactuals based on the ￿nancial market destabilization in the 2007 and 2008 crisis. Section VIII
concludes.
II Data and Variables
Our division-level data used in the estimation come from Compustat segment ￿les covering the
period 1980-2006 and for the counterfactual from 2007-2009. For each division, we have information
on sales, assets, capital expenditures, operating pro￿ts and depreciation along with the Standard
Industrial Classi￿cation (SIC) code for the entire panel. To construct the primary sample, we re￿ne
the segment data by excluding the following ￿rms: (i) those with incomplete division information
on sales, assets or capital expenditures; (ii) those with divisions in the one-digit SIC codes of 6
(￿nancial ￿rms) or 9 (government ￿rms); (iii) those with sales less than $10 million and (iv) those
with data missing on either market value of equity or cash ￿ ow statement items. Following Lang
and Stulz [1994], we also drop ￿rms if: (i) the sum of the division sales is not within 1% of the total
net sales and if the sum of division assets is not within 25% of the ￿rm assets. For remaining ￿rms,
a multiple is applied such that the sum of the recomputed division assets adds up to total assets;
and (ii) the imputed value of the conglomerate is missing. Imputed value of the diversi￿ed ￿rm is
the sum of the division values, with each division valued using median sales and asset multipliers
5of stand-alone ￿rms in that industry. Imposing all the ￿lters described above, results in a sample
of 203,708 diversi￿ed division-years evenly spread out over the sample period.
Table I provides descriptive statistics on sales, assets, cash ￿ ow, capital expenditures, capital
expenditures divided by assets, cash ￿ ow divided by sales, and industry Q. We measure cash ￿ ow as
operating pro￿ts plus depreciation. This measure of cash ￿ ow is standard in the literature and does
not adjust cash ￿ ow for taxes, working capital investments, and other factors because that data is
not available. We de￿ne industry Q as the median Q of stand-alone ￿rms within the same three
digit SIC as the division. In calculating stand-alone Q￿ s, we follow the data de￿nition in Kaplan
and Zingales [1997], where the book value of assets equals Compustat item 6, and the market value
of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity (item 25 times
item 199) less the book value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item
74).
As shown in Table I, stand-alone ￿rms are smaller than divisions of conglomerate ￿rms on the
basis of both sales ($494 million vs. $756 million) and assets ($768 million vs. $1299 million). These
di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. Stand-alone ￿rms appear to operate
in industries with better investment opportunities than those of conglomerate divisions; the mean
industry Q of stand-alone ￿rms is 2.7 as compared to 1.6 for divisions inside a conglomerate. In
addition, stand-alone ￿rms appear to be less pro￿table than divisions of conglomerates as measured
by the cash ￿ ow to asset ratio (11.5% vs. 15.5%). These di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant at
the 1 percent level.
We also report the excess value (EV) of the conglomerate as the log of the ratio of ￿rm
value to its imputed value (Lang and Stulz [1994]). The measure captures the di⁄erence in Q of
the conglomerate relative to a portfolio of stand-alone ￿rms ￿with the median stand-alone ￿rm
operating in the same industry as the division of the conglomerate chosen as the comparison ￿rm.
In the sample, the mean excess value for diversi￿ed ￿rms is -10.8%.
Finally, the table also reports two measures of dispersion in productivity among divisions
for conglomerate ￿rms. Diversity is derived from Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000] (henceforth
RSZ [2000]). It is de￿ned as the standard deviation of the division-asset weighted (imputed)5
market-to-book ratio, Q , divided by the equally weighted average (imputed) division Q; within









, where wj is division j ￿ s share
of total assets, Qj is imputed Q , n is the number of divisions and wQ is the average asset
weighted Qj . The second more simple measure used in the paper, Dispersion is de￿ned as the
standard deviation of division (imputed) market-to-book ratio, Q; within a conglomerate. As can
be observed, on average the Diversity (Dispersion) has a mean value of 0:77 (0:42 ). The results
are not sensitive to using Diversity instead.
5A division￿ s Q is imputed from the median Q of industry in which the division operates as in Lang and Stulz
[1994] and Berger and Ofek [1995].
6III Motivating Facts: Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we provide results that speak directly to our hypothesis on the interaction of internal
and external capital markets and provide facts that help us motivate the economic forces in our
structural model.
III.A Excess Value, Dispersion in Divisional Productivity and External Financ-
ing Conditions
We begin by demonstrating that there is a relationship between dispersion in division productivity
and ￿rm value. This results are indicative of the net cost and bene￿t tradeo⁄ of organizational
structure: conglomerates exhibit a diversi￿cation discount, and the discount is worse for conglom-
erates with dispersed investment opportunities. In Table II, we begin by regressing excess value,
EV of a diversi￿ed ￿rm on standard ￿rm observables. In particular, we estimate:
EVit =
n
￿ + ￿Dispersionit + ￿Zit + ￿t + ￿i + ￿it
o
;
where Z includes other factors that have been used in the literature to explain the value of a




Assets ). In Columns (1) to (3) we use
Diversity while in Columns (4) to (6) we use Dispersion and report the results in Table II.
The estimate in Column (1) shows that diversi￿ed ￿rms with more dispersed productivity
among divisions tend to have lower value as compared to a portfolio of comparable stand-alone
￿rms of similar productivity. The result is robust to including ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (￿i ) and time (￿t
) ￿xed e⁄ects with standard errors clustered at the unit of year or ￿rm. The estimates are large
in economic magnitudes. For instance in Column (1) a half SD increase in dispersion of division
productivity in the diversi￿ed ￿rm (about 0.38) is associated with a 6% increase in its EV ￿which
is large relative to the mean EV for the whole conglomerate sample reported earlier. These results
are similar to those reported in RSZ [2000].
Next, we provide reduced form evidence consistent with our hypothesis that internal capital
markets ameliorate external capital market dislocations. We allow for time varying cost of external
￿nancing by proxying the state of credit markets by the TED spread - the di⁄erence between the
interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. It measures the di⁄erence
between an unsecured deposit rate and the rate on a government backed obligation. While the
TED spread is a conventional proxy for intermediation risk (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and
Shin [2008]) we discuss its potential limitations and how these might a⁄ect our results in Section
V.C.2. In Column (2), we show that conglomerates with more dispersed productivity perform
better relative to stand-alone ￿rms during times at which external capital markets are impaired
and that this improvement is consistent with the patterns of resource allocation we observe. In
particular, during times of tightening credit markets, EV increases more for conglomerates which
have diverse division productivity (coe¢ cient on Dispersion*TED is positive in Column (2)).
7III.B Investment-Q Sensitivity, Dispersion of Divisional Productivity and Ex-
ternal Financing Conditions
We next assess if there are systematic di⁄erences in the investment behavior of stand-alone ￿rms
and related divisions of conglomerate ￿rms. Consistent with the previous literature we show that
￿rm characteristics, which are correlated with low valuations are also related to low sensitivity of
￿rms to measures of productivity. For this purpose, we use standard investment regressions and











Assets is the asset-normalized capital spending of division i of a
conglomerate (or stand-alone ￿rm) in year t . ￿i are division ￿xed e⁄ects and are included to
address the possibility that time-invariant (perhaps technology-driven) di⁄erences in investment
levels among divisions may explain some of the variation. We include year ￿xed e⁄ects (￿t ) to deal
with changing tax regimes and changing state of the business cycle during our sample period.
In Column (3) of Table II, we estimate the regression with both stand-alone ￿rms and diversi￿ed
divisions. As can be observed ￿ is positive suggesting that division investment is sensitive to
productivity. However, ￿ < 0 , which suggests that the Q-sensitivity of diversi￿ed ￿rms is lower
than in stand-alone ￿rms. This fact has been interpreted by RSZ [2000] as evidence of socialist
preferences of diversi￿ed ￿rms.6
Next, in Column (4), we ￿nd that capital expenditures in diversi￿ed ￿rms become more sensitive
to productivity relative to stand-alone ￿rms when external markets are tight ￿proxied by higher
TED. These ￿ndings are related to several studies, which ￿nd di⁄erences in behavior of stand-
alone ￿rms and conglomerates as macroeconomic conditions change (eg., Dimitrov and Tice [2006],
Hovakimian [2011] and Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas [2011]). These results suggests that the relative
increase in value of diversi￿ed ￿rms when markets are tight from Column (2) may be related to the
ability of conglomerates to reallocate resources without the help of external capital markets.
To evaluate this more systematically, in Columns (5) and (6) we restrict the analysis to di-
versi￿ed ￿rms and examine if the sensitivity of investment varies with the extent of dispersion in
productivity among divisions. We estimate a speci￿cation similar to the one above on only diver-
si￿ed ￿rms with Dummy replaced by measures of dispersion of productivity within the diversi￿ed
￿rm. As can be observed from Column (5), we ￿nd that even within diversi￿ed ￿rms ￿ < 0 ￿
indicating that division￿ s investment is less sensitive to Q inside conglomerates with diverse pro-
ductivity. Moreover, consistent with the coe¢ cient Dispersion*TED in Column (2), investment
to Q sensitivity is also higher during high TED periods for conglomerates with more dispersed
6The economic e⁄ects are signi￿cant as well. For example, estimates in Column (2) suggest that a one standard
deviation increase in dispersion of investment opportunities in the diversi￿ed ￿rm reduces the Q-sensitivity of the its
divisions by roughly 10%. We note that most coe¢ cients discussed in Section III are economically signi￿cant but for
brevity we are deferring the discussion on magnitudes until after the estimation of our structural model.
8productivity among divisions (Column (3)).
We also use alternative measures of credit supply constraints such as Baa spread and the FED
senior loan o¢ cer survey to evaluate the robustness of TED and ￿nd similar results (unreported for
brevity). Overall, these results suggest that when the cost of external ￿nancing is high, the internal
capital market becomes relatively more e¢ cient, especially in conglomerates with dispersed division
productivity. The likely reason is that conglomerates can reallocate funds internally without the
￿rm having to incur the cost of raising external funds.
Of course, if Q is mis-measured in a systematic way, either because of issues of measuring pro-
ductivity or endogenous conglomerate composition the estimates presented above will be biased as
well. Further, TED, in addition to measuring variation in credit supply might also capture demand
of conglomerates for funding. As discussed in Section V.C, the major sources of identi￿cation in
our structural model are closely related to reduced form evidence presented here. In that section
we discuss why our identi￿cation is not a⁄ected by measurement error in either productivity or
measures of external capital market frictions. Further, in the Appendix we obtain similar results
as in Table II when we account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price based
shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate.
This reduced form evidence allows us to track only the net bene￿t or cost of resource allocation
inside the ￿rm. However, our goal is to identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation
and how these forces change as the external capital markets change. These quantities are di¢ cult
to disentangle from the "net" estimates in reduced form. We are also interested in quantifying how
much of the dislocation in external capital markets is ameliorated by reallocation in internal capital
markets. This is di¢ cult to study in reduced form because the crisis data are frequently subject to
other shocks, such as declining productivity and government intervention. As we discuss below, the
structural model allows us to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation
decision. We can then conduct counterfactuals in which ￿rms are exposed only to shocks in external
capital markets and study how capital reallocates within ￿rms.
IV Theory
Production and investment
We now model a ￿rm￿ s investment and ￿nancing problem. A ￿rm has n ￿ 1 divisions. All
investment occurs through divisions; i.e. no investment is done at headquarters. The divisions have
no funds on their own; headquarters allocates funds to divisions for investment and collects any
surplus funds divisions generate. This is a standard assumption in the conglomerates literature,
see RSZ [2000] for example. Each division j has per period cash ￿ ows at time t of ktjztj; where




the assets of the division in
that time period. The pro￿tability of the division follows a Markov process with i.i.d pro￿tability
shock "ztj ￿ N (0;￿zjzt￿1j) .
ztj = Gz (zt￿1j) + "ztj; (1)




but depreciates at rate ￿ . Capital evolution in division j is
given by:
ktj = (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1j + It￿1j (2)
Investing has ￿xed and convex adjustment cost. The ￿xed costs of adjustment vary with division
size and are parameterized as IItj>0 (￿0 + ￿1ktj) , where I is an indicator variable. Each division






Cash stock and external market frictions
The headquarters can ￿nance investment internally or can access the external capital markets
at a cost. There is an extensive literature on the tradeo⁄of using internal versus external ￿nancing
to fund investment (eg. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach [2004, 2009], Whited [2006] and Riddick
and Whited [2009]). The ￿rms has a cash stock of pt ￿ 0 . The cash stock evolves over time by
raising external ￿nancing ft; which increases the cash stock in period t+1; and through generating
or consuming funds in the previous period. Let ￿t be the pro￿ts of the ￿rm in period t; then the
￿rm￿ s cash stock evolves according to:
pt+1 = pt + ft + ￿t (3)
Raising external ￿nancing ft the ￿rm incurs both ￿xed and variable cost, and each component is
time varying. This is in line with the literature that ￿nds these costs vary with ￿nancial market





captures the perceived credit supply constraints in the general economy, TED. TED follows a










The ￿xed and variable cost of external ￿nancing can also be decreasing in the combined assets of
the ￿rm
P
j ktj , suggesting that larger ￿rms may be able to borrow more cheaply, potentially by
using assets to obtain collateralized ￿nancing (e.g., Hart and Moore [1995]). We parameterize the




and variable cost of ￿nancing by Ift>0ft
￿





where the quadratic term ￿2
t
accommodates the fact that cost of external ￿nancing can increase non-linearly. We also allow for
quadratic cost of external ￿nancing c8f2
t Ift>0:
Instead of raising external ￿nancing the ￿rm can ￿nance projects from its cash stock. We ensure
that the manager has incentives not to hoard too much cash in the ￿rm by imposing a constant
marginal cost of holding cash for the ￿rm. We are agnostic about the source of the cost. For
instance, one motivation of imposing this cost could be agency related since the manager is likely
to spend some of the resources on ine¢ cient perks (eg, Eisfeldt and Rampini [2008]). Alternatively,
the motivation could be tax driven as in Riddick and Whited [2009]. More speci￿cally, the cost of






: This speci￿cation allows larger ￿rms
10to hold more cash for their day to day operations.
Managerial utility function: corporate socialism
The key innovation in the setup, aside from explicitly incorporating several divisions, is to
incorporate managerial preferences for corporate socialism. The motivation for corporate socialism
follows from the work of RSZ [2000] and Scharfstein and Stein [2000] who argue that incentives for
resource allocation in internal capital markets are distorted away from ￿rst best in the presence of
diverse divisional resources. Headquarters minimizes this distortion by reducing division dispersion
through transfers; from divisions that are large and have good opportunities to divisions that
are small and have poor investment opportunities. Following this, we model utility to corporate
headquarters from socialist behavior as being proportional to diversity in pro￿ts among divisions.
The manager values gross pro￿ts from division j at ztjktj ￿ ￿(ztj ￿ z￿
t)ktj; where z￿
t is




j=1 ztj: This captures the
fact that the manager undervalues pro￿ts from divisions that are more productive than the average
division and overvalues pro￿ts from divisions that are less productive than the average division. An
alternative way of expressing manager￿ s preferences is to express the trade-o⁄between gross pro￿ts
and socialism as ktj ((1 ￿ ￿)ztj + ￿z￿
t) . In other words, the manager values division cash￿ ows as
though the productivity of a division is a weighted average of the productivity of the division and
the average division within the ￿rm.
The managerial per period utility function can then be written as ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ows ￿t minus the
dis-utility arising from corporate socialism, ￿￿
P
j (ztj ￿ z￿
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j (ztj ￿ z￿)ktj
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j IItj>0 ￿ ￿1
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It is useful to summarize our model in the following way. Let ￿ be the parameter vector ￿ =
[1;￿;￿0;￿1;￿2 , c0;:::;c8;;j0;j1]0; kt = [kt1;:::;ktn];zt = [zt1;:::;ztn];st the vector of state variables
st = [kt;zt;pt;￿t]
0 at the vector of actions the ￿rm takes at = [It1;:::;Itn;ft]
0 ; ￿ the strategy of






11The manager then solves:





s:t: ktj = (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1j + It￿1j
pt = pt￿1 + ft￿1 + ￿t￿1;
where the expectation is taken over current and future values of shocks to pro￿tability and external
￿nancing.
It is worth noting that we choose external ￿nancing as a control in our approach, and not the
future cash stock as is common in the literature (Whited [2006]). This is without loss of gener-
ality but results in a pro￿t function linear in parameters, which greatly speeds up our estimation
procedure.7
Discussion: capturing dark and bright side of internal capital markets
The model captures both the bright side (Stein [1997]) and the dark side (RSZ [2000] and
Scharfstein and Stein [2000]) of internal capital markets. The bright side of the model arises
from frictions in external capital markets. The cost of external ￿nancing gives conglomerates an
advantage since they can freely reallocate capital across divisions without incurring this cost. In
our setting this e⁄ect is ampli￿ed by the cost of keeping cash in the ￿rm. In addition, if we compare
a conglomerate to a collection of stand-alone ￿rms that mimic its divisions, the conglomerate can
potentially borrow more cheaply. The idea is that conglomerate can use one division as collateral
for ￿nancing investment in an alternative division of the same ￿rm. Stand-alone ￿rms, on the other
hand, cannot collateralize a separate stand-alone ￿rm in order to raise more investment. This
phenomenon is called ￿ winner picking￿in Stein [1997] and Stein [2003]. The bright side of internal
capital markets ￿ comprising all these e⁄ects ￿ is governed by parameters on cost of external
￿nancing and parameters that govern the agency cost of holding cash in the ￿rm ￿with the e⁄ect
larger when external markets are tight.
The dark side of internal capital markets is captured by manager￿ s preference for corporate
socialism, parameterized by ￿ . Keeping external ￿nancing ￿xed, diversi￿ed ￿rms allocate capital
less e¢ ciently than stand-alone ￿rms due to socialist considerations. In particular, conditional on
the amount of investment the ￿rm is making, the manager is willing to tilt more investment towards
weaker divisions.
Our model provides insights on how the bright and dark side of internal capital markets inside
of a diversi￿ed ￿rm evolve with changes in external capital markets. While corporate socialism may
decrease e¢ ciency of diversi￿ed ￿rms relative to stand-alone ￿rms when credit markets are loose,
tighter external credit markets will tend to increase the bright side of internal capital markets.
In fact, when raising external ￿nancing for stand-alone ￿rms is very costly, diversi￿ed ￿rms may
7Because of this choice we do not have to forward simulate for every vector of parameters in our estimation.
Each forward simulation for our sample takes about 36 hours, so we greatly reduce our estimation time by having to
simulate only once.
12allocate capital more e¢ ciently than stand-alone ￿rms. This suggests that the relative e¢ ciency
of capital allocation in conglomerates versus stand-alone ￿rms is time varying and depends on the
extent of frictions in external ￿nancing and how these frictions interact with socialist motives inside
of diversi￿ed ￿rms. In Section V.C we discuss the sources of variation in the data that allow us to
estimate the model and separate these forces.
V Estimation
In this section we describe the estimator that allows us to obtain the parameters of the model
presented in the previous section. We use the two step estimator developed in Bajari et al [2007].8
Because of the large action space of our ￿rm, computing the value function is expensive, and nesting
such an computation in an estimator even more so. This precludes us from applying estimators that
have been commonly used to estimate investment problems (e.g., Hennessy and Whited [2007]). As
we will argue, using the Bajari et al [2007] estimator also provides a tight link to the reduced form
results and allows us to incorporate our instrument for division productivity in a natural way.
The intuition of the Bajari et al [2007] estimator in our problem is the following. The ￿rst
stage of the estimation is closely related to the reduced form estimation from Section III. We use
￿ exible reduced form regressions to estimate the investment and ￿nancing choices ￿rms make given
their characteristics. In other words, we estimate the ￿rms￿policy function. We also estimate
the expected evolution of productivity and the TED spread (our state variable for credit supply
constraints) i.e., the state transition function. In the second stage of the estimation we use those
estimates to simulate ￿rms￿expected actions (investment and external ￿nancing) and expected
characteristics (capital, amount of cash). For a given set of parameters, the model presented in the
previous section translates ￿rms￿expected actions into managers￿expected utility.
The estimator then uses the insight that managers￿make choices that maximize their expected
utility. In other words, were they to make alternative choices, their utility would be weakly lower. To
implement this insight we create alternative policy functions, i.e. ￿rms choose di⁄erent investment
and external ￿nancing than they do in the data. We then simulate ￿rms￿expected actions and
expected characteristics and again use the model (for a given set of parameters) to translate these
into expected utility. We choose the set of parameters that assign the highest expected utility to
the choices that are actually taken by the ￿rms in the data. These parameters are our estimates.
V.A First Stage
V.A.1 Assumptions
In order to be able to recover the policy function from the data using our speci￿cations, Bajari et
al [2007] show that two assumptions need to be satis￿ed:
8Bajari et al [2007] provide a framework for estimating Markov perfect equilibria of dynamic games. While our
problem is a decision problem of a ￿rm, not a game, we are faced with the same computational problems that plague
the dynamic games literature.
13Assumption MC: @2ut
@at@"t ￿ 0; where ut is our per period managerial utility function. This
assumption is trivially satis￿ed.
Assumption S1: The assumption in our speci￿cations below is that they are rich enough to
approximate the true policy function in the data. We mostly use second degree polynomials.
V.A.2 Policy Function
We start our estimation by recovering our policy function from the data. In other words, we
are interested in how ￿rms￿state variables, the capital of each division, its productivity, ￿rms￿
cash stock and the TED spread map into its choices. To recover our policy function we use second
degree polynomials to approximate the policy functions. Since we assume investment is irreversible,
it cannot be negative. We incorporate that by estimating a tobit for investment. Speci￿cally, we















where Q2 (;￿) represents a second degree polynomial and ￿ the vector of coe¢ cients.
V.A.3 State Transition Function
Next, we have to recover our state transition function from the data. The state transition function
maps the state variables and choice variables in period t to state variables in period t+1; st+1 =
P (st;"t;at): We are interested in how ￿rms￿ state variables, the capital of each division, its
productivity, ￿rms￿cash stock and the TED spread map together with ￿rms￿choice of investment
and external ￿nance into ￿rms￿state variables next year. In contrast to the policy function, we can
use theory to guide the shape of our state transition functions. First, we can use the law of motion
for capital: capital in the next period is capital from the previous period, minus depreciation, plus
investment, so we estimate the rate of capital depreciation from the data using a linear regression
kt+1j = (1 ￿ ￿)ktj + Itj + "ktj (7)
The evolution of division￿ s productivity ztj is governed by a Markov process, in which a
division￿ s productivity depends only on its productivity in the previous period. We approximate
the evolution of division productivity with linear splines, where Gi () is a linear spline with 9 knots
at the deciles of the productivity distribution.
ztj+1 = Gz (ztj) + "ztj (8)
Similarly, the evolution of the TED spread is also a Markov process and is independent of ￿rm
speci￿c variables:
￿t+1 = ￿￿ + ￿￿￿t + "￿t (9)
14We then recover the state transition function for the ￿rm cash policy. Because the cash stock









We also use speci￿cations (8) and (9) to recover the dispersion of the pro￿t shocks ￿ ("z) and
the dispersion of the shocks to the TED ￿ ("z) from the estimated residuals.
V.A.4 Bias in productivity measurement9
As we discuss later in Section V.C, a major source of identi￿cation in our model is the division
investment response to its own productivity and the productivity of other divisions and how it
relates to variation in the TED spread. If productivity is mis-measured in a systematic way, either
because of issues of measuring productivity or endogenous conglomerate composition, our estimates
will be biased as well. We account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price
based shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate. Intuitively, we
exploit variation in industry productivity driven by oil prices which generates an instrument for
productivity dispersion among divisions. Since divisions comprising conglomerates are exposed to
oil prices in di⁄erent ways, a change in oil prices will di⁄erentially change divisions￿productivity,
changing the productivity dispersion in a conglomerate exogenously.
The procedure entails two steps: ￿rst, to obtain industry productivity driven by oil prices
we regress two digit SIC industry median productivity on oil prices (real oil price per barrel in
USD) over our sample period. We then calculate the movements in median industry productivity
driven by oil prices. Formally, we ￿rst project the median productivity of a division￿ s industry in
a given year on oil price in that year to obtain the sensitivity of industry productivity on oil price.
Speci￿cally, let K index an industry ztK be the productivity of the median ￿rm in the industry
and xt the oil price at time t . The regression we estimate is:
ztK = ￿K + ￿Kxt + "kt:
This yields an estimate of industry median productivity variation driven by oil prices, c oilKt =
^ ￿K +^ ￿Kxt . In order to only exploit this variation in ￿rm productivity, we then estimate the policy
and state transition functions using the instrumental variables control function approach with c oilKt
as our instrument. In particular, we obtain a division level control function as a residual from the
regression of the measured productivity of the division j , ztj on the industry median productivity
variation driven by oil c oiljt :
ztj = ￿ + ￿c oiljt + "jt;
We include these division level residuals as additional regressors in the policy function and transi-
tion function to control for systematic biases in measured productivity. As an additional check for
9We would like to thank Lars Hansen for helpful discussions on how to implement the instrument.
15validity of our instrument, we replicate the reduced form regressions discussed in Section III. The
results, reported and discussed in the Appendix, suggest that the instrument is valid.
V.B Second Stage
In the second stage we estimate our parameter vector ￿ = [1;￿;￿0;￿1;￿2;c0;:::;c8;j0;j1]
0 : We can
write the value of the ￿rm pursuing a strategy ￿n at state s at time i as Vt (s;￿n;￿): Following










































Because our utility function is linear in parameters, we can write the value function of pursuing
policy ￿n at state s at time i :
Vi (s;￿n;￿) = Wi (s;￿n)￿
Imposing the optimallity condition, we know that for every alternative policy at the true value
of the parameter ￿ :
Vi (s;￿n;￿) ￿ Vi (s;￿￿;￿)
Wi (s;￿n)￿ ￿ Wi (s;￿￿)￿;
where ￿￿ is the true policy function of the ￿rm. Write a pro￿table deviation of optimal policy as
g (s;￿n) = max(0;(Wi (s;￿n) ￿ Wi (st;￿￿))￿
Bajari et al [2007] then exploit the fact that at the true value of the parameter vector,
the true policy function maximizes the expected utility at every state. Intuitively, to obtain our
parameter value we choose a parameter that minimizes square pro￿table deviations from the true
policy function. We write the moment condition as
Z
g (s;￿n)
2 dH1 (s)dH2 (￿s);
where H1 is a distribution of possible states and H2 a distribution of alternative policies.
To obtain the sample counterpart of the moment condition, we generate alternative policies and
expected payo⁄s from these policies. We perturb the policy functions with additive perturbations
drawn from the empirical distribution of errors ^ ￿ ("I) and ^ ￿ ("f) obtained from estimating policy
functions as speci￿ed in (5) and (6). We perturb only one dimension of our policy function at any
16instant and do so for 50 alternative policies for each dimension of our policy function. For example,



























I; we draw "k
I from N~(0; ^ ￿ ("I)) where k indexes the perturbed
policy. Then we generate an additional 50 alternative policies by perturbing the estimated policy
function for division 2. Last we generate 50 policies by perturbing the external ￿nancing policy 50
times, drawing perturbations from N~(0; ^ ￿ ("f)) .
To compute the expected pro￿ts for a policy at a certain state we forward simulate productivity
shocks and shocks to TED for 100 periods (years) to obtain the evolution of state and choice








obtained from state transition functions as speci￿ed in (8) and (9) respectively. We set the discount
rate ￿ = 0:95: The results are robust to di⁄erent levels of ￿ . We draw 1000 paths from each
observation in our data to compute the expected pro￿ts for each observation. Drawing from data
allows us to cover a wide space of potentially achievable states. We stop the forward simulation at
100 years and approximate the continuation value of a policy with the value of its capital at that
point￿ the scraping value of the ￿rm .
Let ns be the number of observations in the data and np is the number of alternative policies.
We obtain the estimate of our parameter vector by solving:







The parameter vector is identi￿ed from the optimallity condition: the true policy function
should have higher utility than any alternative policy function, but the amount of extra utility
is not informative. Therefore, we obtain our estimate by minimizing the violations of optimallity
condition. Because the optimallity condition is an inequality, it is possible that there could be
several vectors of parameters that would satisfy all inequalities, thus identifying a set of parameters
for the model. In our estimates that is not the case, so all our parameter estimates are singletons.
Because our utility function is linear in parameters, we only need to forward simulate once to obtain
expected utility for all policies for any set of parameters.
Linearity of parameters also allows us to search for a global minimum￿ we initialize our min-
imization procedure from 500 di⁄erent starting points. We obtain our standard errors using a
non-parametric bootstrap of ￿ . We draw 250 random sub-samples (with replacement); each sub-
sample is the size of the original data that we use in our simulation (for each of these points, we
17compute all alternative policy functions). As in Bajari et al [2010] and Ryan [2010] these standard
errors do not take into account that the policy function and state transition function are themselves
estimates, and that we compute our expectations with a ￿nite number of simulated paths. As a
result, our standard errors will be slightly biased downwards.
V.C Identi￿cation
V.C.1 Sources of variation
Before we proceed to the results from our model it is useful to think about which features in the
data identify the parameters in the model, given the exogenous (instrumented) productivity shocks
and external capital conditions. The identi￿cation in the structural model is closely related to the
reduced form estimation from Section III. In the reduced form model, a ￿too low￿responsiveness of
investment to productivity is a sign of miss-allocation. The model uses all coe¢ cients from the ￿rst
stage regressions simultaneously and interprets ￿too low￿in a quantitative sense using an explicit
production model and expected utility maximization by the manager. While the model is quite
complex, and forces are identi￿ed jointly, it is useful to provide some basic tradeo⁄s and how they
would a⁄ect the data.
A large source of identi￿cation is the sensitivity of division investment to its own productivity
and the productivity of other divisions. In a frictionless world, the allocation of capital would
be such that the marginal productivity of investment would equal its marginal cost (absent ￿xed
cost). There are two main sources of frictions in our model which will incorporate the productivity
of one division in the investment decision of the other division. The ￿rst is corporate socialism. If
corporate socialism is high, the investment of a division will be higher if other divisions are more
productive. In particular, if a division is more productive than the mean productivity across all
divisions in a ￿rm, it will invest more than it otherwise would, and vice versa. The instrument
allows us to separate this variation from productivity mis-measurement.
The second friction is the cost of raising external capital, which increases the shadow cost of
investing. In contrast to corporate socialism, cost of raising external capital induces investment
in a division to decrease in the productivity of other divisions. E⁄ectively, productivity of other
divisions raises the opportunity cost of investing. To see the intuition, consider the situation in
which a ￿rm is not able to raise any outside ￿nancing. With no corporate socialism the optimal
investment equates the marginal return to investing in both divisions. If we can pin down the
cost of external ￿nancing, dispersion in productivity across divisions in a ￿rm would identify the
parameter of corporate socialism.
Several features in the data help us pin down cost of external ￿nancing and cost of holding
cash, which are interdependent. The ￿rst is the response of investment to the level of productivity.
Cost of external ￿nancing introduces a wedge between the cost of capital implied by our production
model and the cost of capital faced by the ￿rm; the higher the cost, the larger the wedge. The second
is the responsiveness of external ￿nancing to productivity. Were there no cost of external ￿nancing,
18the ￿rm would raise enough external ￿nancing to equate the marginal product of investment (given
￿xed cost and corporate socialism) to its marginal cost.
Similarly, the ￿rm would pay out all the surplus cash. With cost of external ￿nancing and
cost of holding cash, the ￿rm does not raise enough ￿nancing and holds a stock of cash. First,
obtaining external ￿nancing introduces cost. Further, the ￿rm needs to take into account the cost
of holding cash. It uses the stock of cash to protect itself from incurring cost of external ￿nancing
in the future, but holding cash is costly. Therefore if the ￿rm raises too much cash, it will have to
pay the cost of holding it if it does not use it for investment right away. In other words, the higher
the cost of holding cash, the lower is external ￿nancing that exceeds current investment needs.
Finally, to identify the time varying component of cost of external ￿nancing we exploit the
exogenous variation in TED. The primary source of identi￿cation is the correlation of external
￿nancing and TED. However, the cash and investment policies of the ￿rm are also informative,
because they are a⁄ected by the time variation in cost of external ￿nancing. Holding cash protects
the ￿rm￿ s ability to invest during temporary spikes in cost of external ￿nancing, so how the ￿rm￿ s
cash stock evolves with TED is also informative on this dimension. Investment also responds to
spikes in external cost of ￿nancing, since the ￿rm trades o⁄ investing now relative to investing in
the future, when external ￿nance may be easier to access.
V.C.2 Measurement error
The major sources of identi￿cation in our model are the division investment response to its own
productivity, the division investment response to productivity dispersion among divisions of a con-
glomerate, and how these investment responses are related to variation in TED spreads. Both our
baseline measure of productivity, Q, and our measure of credit supply constraints, TED, could be
mis-measured in a systematic way, biasing our estimates. For instance, Q could be a poor measure
of productivity. Further, dispersion in Q could be biased because of conglomerate composition.
Finally, TED, in addition to measuring variation in credit supply might also capture demand of
conglomerates for funding. We now discuss the criteria that the measurement error would have to
satisfy in order to generate our results, and argue that such measurement error is highly implausible.
We ￿rst construct an alternative measure of productivity to assess the robustness of our esti-
mates to measurement error. As explained below, the alternative measure, return on assets (ROA),
is in fact a natural empirical counterpart to our productivity variable. Even though our ￿ndings
are similar using either productivity measure, we use Q as our primary variable. This allows us to
tightly map our ￿ndings to the large empirical literature on internal capital markets that also uses
Q as a proxy for productivity. Similarly, we use alternative measures of credit supply constraints
such as Baa spread and the FED senior loan o¢ cer survey to evaluate the robustness of TED. Of
course, simply using alternative productivity and credit supply measures is not a panacea to all
measurement problems.
While there may be several types of measurement error, the error which may a⁄ect our esti-
mation has to be of a speci￿c type. Our model predicts that high productivity divisions have lower
19investment in conglomerates with more dispersed productivity. Further, during times of high TED,
this e⁄ect of dispersion on investments is smaller. Therefore, for measurement error to generate
results in line with our model, the productivity of high productivity divisions has to be systemati-
cally upward biased, this bias has to be larger in conglomerates with more dispersed productivity.
Further, this measurement error has to increase during times of high TED. The converse should
also be true for low productivity divisions.
The same reasoning also suggests that the variation in TED that identi￿es our model does not
proxy for aggregate credit demand. Our model predicts that if TED measures credit supply, then
the investment sensitivity to productivity of high productivity divisions should increase, and more
so in conglomerates with more dispersed division productivity. The converse would be true for low
productivity divisions. If high TED proxies for low aggregate credit demand it is hard to see how
an increase in TED would induce type of heterogeneous investment response that is predicted by
our model.
Nevertheless, we also address the potential measurement error concerns in two additional
ways. First, we account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price based shifter
of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate. Since divisions comprising con-
glomerates are in di⁄erent industries, a change in oil prices will di⁄erentially change divisions￿
productivity, changing the productivity dispersion in a conglomerate exogenously. If an increase
in oil price increases the productivity dispersion among divisions based on their industry, then our
model predicts that high productivity divisions decrease their sensitivity of investment to produc-
tivity. On the other hand, if an increase in oil prices decreases the productivity dispersion among
divisions based on their industry, then our model predicts that high productivity divisions increase
the sensitivity of investment to productivity. In other words, for measurement error in produc-
tivity to drive our results, once we incorporate the instrument, one would have to believe that an
increase in oil prices drives measurement error exactly in the way our model predicts. Also note
that the investment response to an oil price increase can be positive or negative, depending on the
composition of the conglomerate. Therefore it is hard to generate the results from our model if oil
prices simply proxy for aggregate movements in either demand or supply.
Second, in our counterfactual exercise, we take the estimates from our model during the pre-
crisis period (up to 2006) and simulate ￿rm behavior in the crisis period (2007-2010).10 Even
though this was a very tumultuous period unlike any we have seen since the Great Depression, we
￿nd that the patterns in the actual data during the crisis are remarkably similar to the simulated
data from our model. Again, it is hard to see how our model would predict ￿rm behavior out of
sample in the crisis, if the estimates were driven by some measurement error. For example, it is
hard to see how TED shocks cause heterogenous responses between di⁄erent types of conglomerates
(in the exact direction predicted by the model) if they proxy for aggregate credit demand.
Taken together these arguments paint a consistent picture. The argument that potential sources
10This approach is similar in spirit to the exercise in Gomes and Livdan [2004] who simulate data using their model
and compare the moments with actual data.
20of measurement error are generating our estimates faces a very high hurdle. It has to generate very
speci￿c patterns in the data along several dimensions.
VI Empirical Results
In this section we present the results from estimating our model presented in Section IV. We
restrict our attention to conglomerates with two or three divisions, which cover 90 percent of
diversi￿ed ￿rms in our sample. We do not have enough data on conglomerates with more than
three divisions to estimate the policy functions with enough precision. Most of our parameters are
estimated statistically signi￿cantly at 1 percent.
VI.A Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets
The dark side of internal capital markets in our model arises because of managerial preferences for
corporate socialism. Estimating these preferences is the most novel contribution of this paper￿ while
there are other estimates of frictions in external capital markets (Hennessy and Whited [2007]), this
is the ￿rst paper that provides structural estimates of the distortions in capital allocation between
divisions in a ￿rm. This estimate allow us to quantify the cost of internal capital markets.
Our estimates using Q as a measure of productivity are presented in Panel A of Table III. The
estimate of corporate socialism parameter ￿ is 0:76 , and is estimated statistically signi￿cantly.
As is predicted by the theory (eg. RSZ [2000]), the parameter estimate falls between 0 and 1 ,
suggesting that managers care about equality among divisions￿cash-￿ ows, holding all else equal.
Note that since we do not constrain ￿ to be positive, we could have estimated a negative ￿ which
would imply that managers prefer excess Darwinism by placing too much weight on divisions with
strong cash-￿ ows.
To illustrate the magnitude of ￿; consider a back of the envelope calculation: suppose the ￿rm
has two divisions, and division 1 is ￿ times as productive as division 2, i.e. z1 = ￿z2; ￿ > 1 . The
manager values a dollar of revenues produced by a unit of capital of a division at
kizi￿￿ki(zi￿z￿)
kizi :
In other words, the manager behaves as though she is maximizing the value of the ￿rm under
the belief that the productivity of the division is a weighted average of division productivity and
average division productivity, (1 ￿ ￿)zij + ￿z￿: Therefore, she values the dollar produced at the





2 and the less productive division at





: The average ratio of productivity for two division ￿rms in
our sample is 1:32 . At this dispersion and our estimate of ￿; the manager values revenues of the
stronger division at 0:91 and the revenues of the weaker division at 1:12:
Corporate socialism is worse for conglomerates that have more diverse productivity di⁄erences
between divisions. To see this more clearly, consider a conglomerate whose productivity ratio is a
standard deviations above the mean at 1:82: the manager values the revenues from the stronger
division at 0:83 and the less productive division at 1:30 . Therefore we show that the manager
21is willing to tilt more investment towards a weak division, and the tilt can be signi￿cant in con-
glomerates with very dispersed productivity. Overall, we estimate signi￿cant costs associated with
internal capital markets. In absence of external capital market frictions these estimates reveal the
large advantage of stand-alone ￿rms over conglomerates.
VI.B Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets
The bright side of internal capital markets in our model arises because of frictions in external
capital markets. As discussed before in Section IV, the bright side of internal capital markets is
governed by parameters on cost of external ￿nancing and parameters that govern the cost of holding
cash in the ￿rm. We are interested in the average cost of ￿nancing, how this cost changes with our
measure of external market conditions, the TED spread, and in ￿ winner picking.￿
Average cost of ￿nancing
Since our cost of ￿nancing vary with TED, we ￿rst evaluate the cost of ￿nancing at the average
TED spread in our sample of 0:44 percent. Our estimates imply a ￿xed cost of ￿nancing of 2:4
$mm. This yields mean ￿xed cost of 3 percent, slightly smaller than the ￿ndings of Hennessy and
Whited [2007] for large ￿rms. We also ￿nd marginal cost of 12 percent, evaluated at the median
size of a two division ￿rm. These estimates are slightly larger than those found in Hennessy and
Whited [2007] of 8.6 percent. Moreover, consistent with Hennessy and Whited [2007] we also ￿nd
little evidence of increasing marginal cost with the size of the issue. While these estimates are
somewhat higher, it is worth noting that they rapidly decline with the size of the ￿rm due to
winner picking as discussed below.
￿ Winner picking￿
Conglomerates have an advantage over stand-alone ￿rms because they can use one division as
collateral for ￿nancing investment in an alternative division of the same ￿rm. Stand-alone ￿rms, on
the other hand, cannot collateralize a separate stand-alone ￿rm in order to raise more investment.
This e⁄ect is akin to Stein [1997] ￿ winner picking￿and is parameterized by ￿(c3 + c7ft)
Ift>0 P
j ktj:
To illustrate the magnitude of this bene￿t consider the following example in the spirit of Stein
[1997] and Stein [2003]. Suppose a conglomerate has two divisions, only one of which has an
investment opportunity. Suppose, also, that the conglomerate has median assets for two division
conglomerates in our sample of 70 $mm, or 35 $mm per division. The conglomerate wants to
raise external ￿nancing to ￿nance the pro￿table investment opportunity at the median amount
in our sample of 14 $mm. We compare this conglomerate to two independent ￿rms, which have
the same productivity and assets as the individual divisions of the conglomerate. However, only
the more productive ￿rm wants to raise ￿nancing, since it is the only one with a good investment
opportunity.
The example, while admittedly quite stark, allows us to see the ￿ winner picking￿e⁄ect very
clearly. In particular, the winner picking advantage is computed as the di⁄erence between the
￿nancing cost of the conglomerate and the stand-alone. Evaluated at the quantities described above,





(c3 + c714): Our estimates imply a ￿ winner picking￿
22advantage of 0.95$mm, or approximately 6:8 percent. While this does represent a substantial
advantage of a conglomerate, the example considered here is quite extreme.
Cost of holding cash
Our model imposes a constant marginal cost of holding cash for the ￿rm. We are agnostic
about the source of the cost; it can be agency related or tax driven, as in Riddick and Whited
[2009]. The costs of holding cash is a modeling device that gives managers the incentive to pay-out
funds to suppliers of capital and prevents the ￿rm from hoarding cash. In other words, it allows
the model to rationalize the observed pay-out of capital.
Nevertheless, the magnitude is relevant, since it is related to the shadow cost of cash holdings,
one of the main determinants of the bright side of internal capital markets. The costlier it is to
hold cash, the more valuable is the role of internal capital markets, which can shift capital between
investment opportunities and conserve on holding a large stock of costly cash. Our estimates suggest
that the marginal cost of holding cash is approximately 30 percent. This magnitude rationalizes
the fact that conglomerates frequently pay dividends and conduct share repurchases.
VI.C E⁄ect of time varying credit market conditions
In our model we allow for time varying cost of external ￿nancing, where the variation is driven by
changes in the TED spread: as the TED spread increases, so does the cost of accessing the external
capital market.
To illustrate how external ￿nancing costs change with the TED spread, we use the estimates
from Panel A of Table III and compute how the total external ￿nancing cost increases at the median
amount of external capital in our sample (14 $mm). The quadratic component implies that the
TED shocks a⁄ect the cost of external ￿nancing in a convex manner. In fact, evaluated at the
median size of external ￿nancing, TED values below 1 percent do not change the cost of accessing
external capital markets signi￿cantly￿ staying close to 7 $mm. At a TED of 1.5 percent the cost has
increased to over 12 $mm, and exceeds $25 by the time TED reaches 2 percent. Therefore, when
the external markets are dislocated (high values of TED), only ￿rms with excellent investment
opportunities can justify obtaining external ￿nancing to ￿nance projects at hand.
What do these numbers mean? These calculations imply a large shadow value of internal
funds. In other words, having internal funds at disposal has more value when external markets
are dislocated. Since the internal funds can be shifted in internal capital markets relatively more
e¢ ciently relative to non-integrated ￿rms, these results also suggest that the relative e¢ ciency of
di⁄erent organizational forms is time varying. Alternatively put, since the dark and bright sides
of internal capital markets are measured relative to stand-alone ￿rms, these results show that the
conglomerate cost/bene￿t trade-o⁄is not constant over time but is rather a function of state of the
external capital markets.
In Section VII, we present an alternative way of evaluating the impact of time varying credit
market conditions on allocation of resources inside the ￿rm. We do so by examining a counterfactual
scenario in which we expose ￿rms to external market stress as measured by TED spread spike during
23the credit market freeze of 2007/2008. In this scenario we study the change in investment behavior
of divisions in a diversi￿ed ￿rm relative to a stand-alone ￿rm. The responses of the ￿rm based on
our estimates are then compared to the actual data to evaluate the ￿t of our model.
VI.D Estimates with an alternative measure of productivity
As discussed earlier, we have so far focused on using Q as a measure of productivity since it
allowed us to compare our estimates to those from the literature. We now conduct additional tests
with an alternative measure of productivity, the return on assets (ROA ), to assess the robustness
of our estimates. In fact, ROA is a natural empirical counterpart to our productivity variable zij.
We compute the ROA of a division in a year as the cash ￿ ows of the division in that year divided
by its capital. We obtain cash￿ ows of a division as the sum of the operating cash ￿ ow and the
reported accounting depreciation in the year. In the model, a division produces zijkij cash ￿ ows
and has assets of kij; so ROA ￿
zijkij
kij = zij:
The results follow a strikingly close pattern as those presented in Panel B of Table III. Specif-
ically, the results yield a similar degree of corporate socialism with ￿ = 0:69 as compared to 0:76
when Q is used as the measure of productivity in Panel A. Compared to the estimates using Q
as the measure of productivity, we ￿nd a higher ￿xed cost of external ￿nancing (9 percent at the
mean level of TED spread) and a smaller marginal cost of ￿nancing (of 5 percent), evaluated at
the median size of a two division ￿rm. Other parameters are also qualitatively similar to those
reported in Panel A. Overall, the results in this section provide comfort that the measurement error
in Q is not the likely source of variation driving our estimates.
VII Do ￿rm boundaries mediate ￿nancial sector shocks?
We next explore how shocks to the ￿nancial sector are mediated by resource allocation inside
diversi￿ed ￿rms using our estimated model. We use the recent ￿nancial crisis of 2007/2008 to
simulate the disruption in the supply of ￿nancial capital and study how shocks to the supply of
capital are propagated di⁄erentially through stand-alones and conglomerates. This allows us to
examine the consequences of the credit shock on ￿rm value and how this change in value is related
to the allocation of resources within ￿rms.
VII.A Analysis using simulated data
We start with a random sample of conglomerates and stand-alone ￿rms at the end of 2007 and
expose the ￿rms in the sample to realized values of TED for 2008, 2009 and 2010. We forward
simulate our model by drawing productivity shocks from 2008 and shocks to TED from 2010 onward
for 100 periods. In other words, we conduct our simulation as though the crisis had no e⁄ects on ￿rm
productivity, but only a⁄ected capital market conditions. We draw 1000 sequences of potential
shock realizations. Note that at any point in time ￿rms￿expectations of TED are governed by our
model: a ￿rm in 2008 does not know the realization of TED in 2009, it only forms an expectation
24given TED in 2008. The realization of TED, however, is the one from the data for 2009. Similarly
for 2009 and 2010. From 2010 onward we simulate possible paths for TED consistent with our
model.
In Panel A of Table IV we present regressions with simulated data. We ￿rst examine the
impact of TED shocks on the value of conglomerates relative to stand alone ￿rms, measured by
excess value (EV). We use data based on the forward simulation and de￿ne EV as before. In
particular, EV is de￿ned as the log of the ratio of ￿rm value11 of a conglomerate computed relative
to the value of a portfolio of stand-alone ￿rms ￿with the median stand-alone ￿rm operating in the
same industry as the division of the conglomerate chosen as the comparison ￿rm. In Column (1),
we restrict ourselves to three years around the TED shock. This allows us to make comparisons
with actual data, which is only available from 2007 to 2009. As can be observed, during these years
the relationship between EV and dispersion in productivity is positive. This result is related to the
evidence presented earlier (Table II) where the relationship between EV and Dispersion becomes
less negative during periods of tightened credit markets.
In Figure 2(a) we present the evolution of the diversi￿cation discount in our simulations over
time. We ￿nd that the conglomerate discount decreases as TED spikes in 2008 but increases when
TED drops in 2009 and 2010. In other words, as external market conditions tighten, conglomerates
become more e¢ cient relative to stand-alone ￿rms. This pattern emerges in Panel A of Table IV
as well. The relationship between EV and dispersion in division productivity, which was positive in
years around the TED shock (Column 1), changes signs in periods after the TED shock (Column
6).
Next, we explore the source of this increase in relative e¢ ciency of conglomerates. These ￿rms,
while subject to corporate socialism, are able to direct resources between divisions, while stand-
alone ￿rms are unable to utilize the external capital market to the same e⁄ect. In Column (2), we
con￿rm that this relative value increase of diversi￿ed ￿rms is related to the ability of conglomerates
to reallocate resources without the help of external capital markets. In particular, we ￿nd that
capital expenditures in diversi￿ed ￿rms become more sensitive to productivity relative to stand-
alone ￿rms. In the next three columns we report the relationship between capital expenditures
and productivity for diversi￿ed ￿rms only. Column (3) uses data on all the diversi￿ed ￿rms in
the sample. Columns (4) and (5) use samples strati￿ed on whether the value of Dispersion for a
conglomerate is above or below median relative to other diversi￿ed ￿rms in the sample as of 2007.
The results show that sensitivity of capital expenditures to productivity is higher for conglomerates
with more diverse division productivity.12
We show the same pattern in Figure 2(b): as TED increases in 2008, conglomerates are able
to invest more in high productivity divisions relative to comparable stand-alone ￿rms. Conversely,
Figure 2(c) shows that investment in low productivity divisions in a conglomerate falls in relative
11We compute ￿rm value as the expected present value of cash-￿ ows of the ￿rm across simulated paths. In
particular, we do not include managerial dis-utility in the calculation of value.
12In unreported tests we ￿nd that this increase in investment to Q sensitivity of conglomerates with diverse
investment opportunities is largely driven by divisions with above average investment opportunities.
25terms over this time period.
VII.B Comparison with real data: Out of sample validation
Even though we estimate the model based on data from 1980 to 2006, the out of sample simula-
tions produce results that are remarkably consistent with the patterns from actual data over the
simulation period of 2007 to 2009. Panel B of Table IV presents these results. We include 2007 as a
baseline pre-crisis year in Panel B, since it represents the starting point for our simulation. There-
fore, by construction, there is no di⁄erence between the simulated and actual data in 2007. Note
that this di⁄ers from the time period used in simulation results presented in Panel A (post 2007).
Using this data we ￿nd that the di⁄erence in value of the conglomerate relative to a comparable
portfolio of stand-alone ￿rms decreases as the crisis intensi￿ed (coe¢ cient DummyY ear=08or09 in
Column (1)). Moreover, the relationship between the excess value of conglomerates and dispersion
in division productivity is positive during the crisis period relative to the period before it.
In addition, this relative increase in the value of diversi￿ed ￿rms is related to the ability of con-
glomerates to reallocate resources without the help of external capital markets: capital expenditures
in diversi￿ed ￿rms become more sensitive to productivity relative to stand-alone ￿rms (Column
(2)); further, conglomerates with more diverse division productivity have a higher sensitivity of
capital expenditures to productivity (Columns (3) to (5)). In other words, as external market con-
ditions tighten, conglomerates became more e¢ cient relative to stand-alone ￿rms. These patterns
are also consistent with those found in Kuppuswamy and Villalonga [2010] who use data from 2007
to 2009 and ￿nd a decrease in the diversi￿cation discount at the beginning of the crisis.
VII.C Discussion
While the counterfactual makes a stark assumption ￿ the crisis was driven solely through an
increase in the cost of accessing external capital markets with ￿rm productivity and investment
opportunities staying at pre-crisis levels ￿the ￿ndings are nevertheless informative on several fronts.
First, as mentioned earlier, the patterns generated by the out of sample simulation are remarkably
consistent with the actual data. Second, these ￿ndings again reiterate that corporate socialism in
diversi￿ed ￿rms may not be static ￿it tends to attenuate when the external credit market is tight.
Finally, these ￿ndings suggest that an increase in the stress in the ￿nancial markets could be
ameliorated by diversi￿ed ￿rms through more e¢ cient resource allocation. The relative value of
an average diversi￿ed ￿rm improves from around -21% to -17.5% in the ￿rst year after the ￿nancial
market dislocation. This amounts to a 16% change in relative valuation. This e⁄ect is magni￿ed
for diversi￿ed ￿rms with more dispersed division productivity. The e⁄ect increases to 30% if we
consider ￿rms in the top quartile based on the dispersion of productivity between divisions.
Of course, the recent ￿nancial crisis was not solely driven by a ￿nancial market freeze. The crisis
was accompanied by real changes in productivity and large government interventions. Our model
allows us to separate the pure e⁄ect of the ￿nancial market channel on reallocation decisions from
other contemporaneous e⁄ects by comparing the quantitative results from our simulations to the
26actual data. Our model predicts a smaller increase in EV than was actually realized. It suggests
that of the 5 percentage point increase in the excess value of conglomerates,13 3.5 percentage
points (Figure 2(a)) are due to ￿nancial market conditions. Examining reduced form conglomerate
valuations would therefore overstate the extent to which capital reallocation within ￿rms mediates
the e⁄ect of ￿nancial shocks by up to 30%. Moreover, our simulation suggests that if the crisis were
a pure ￿nancial phenomenon, with no changes in productivity, ￿rms would have a higher investment
to Q sensitivity than they actually did during the crisis. This suggests that expectations about
productivity during the crisis did not stay unchanged, as our simulation assumes, but had decreased
from their 2007 levels, which is consistent with evidence in Kahle and Stulz [2010].
VIII Conclusion
We show that improved resource allocation within ￿rms￿internal capital markets provides an
important force countervailing ￿nancial market dislocation. We quantify the forces driving the
reallocation decision by estimating a structural model of internal capital markets. This result has
potentially important policy implications. Interventions aimed at de-clogging the banking systems
during recessionary periods, such as during the great recession of 2008-2009, consider the potential
e⁄ects on output of ￿rms due to hampered credit. The ￿ndings in this paper suggest that unlike
what has been assumed so far in the literature on the credit channel, some ￿rms reallocate resources
internally to signi￿cantly mediate the e⁄ect of ￿nancial shocks. Therefore, these e⁄ects may also
be critical to understanding the consequences of policy interventions. This is especially important
in light of the fact that diversi￿ed ￿rms comprise large parts of economies around the world.
Our analysis is agnostic about the forces that shape corporate socialism in a ￿rm. It is
reasonable to conjecture that bargaining between top management and outside investors could be
driving part of this e⁄ect akin to Scharfstein and Stein [2000]. In addition, it is likely that the
bargaining of divisional managers with the headquarters might also be a⁄ecting the extent of tilt
in capital allocation by headquarters. Evaluating whether and how these forces shape the extent
of socialism in a ￿rm is a fruitful area of future research.
More broadly, understanding how ￿rm boundaries mediate ￿nancial shocks could be useful in
providing insights on macroeconomic movements. Existing literature suggests that distortions in
resource allocation between ￿rms can have large e⁄ects on aggregate TFP (e.g., Bloom [2009]). In
contrast, we study particular sources of distortions to resource allocation- both within and between
￿rms- and quantify their magnitudes. As a result we provide a new channel through which the
nature of external credit markets may a⁄ect the productivity and output of the economy. Our
work suggests that resource allocation within ￿rm boundaries may play a larger role in determining
macro outcomes such as business cycle ￿ uctuations, total factor productivity and ultimately the
path of growth, than has been generally believed.
13To evaluate the change in conglomerate discount during the crisis, we compute the net e⁄ect of the 2008 - 2009
dummy evaluated at mean dispersion in Column (1), Table IV, Panel B.
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30Appendix:
In Table A1 of the Appendix we show that we obtain similar results as in Table II when
we account for potential bias in measured productivity in our estimator using an oil price based
shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate. In the reduced form
estimation we instrument directly for dispersion in productivity. We take the ￿tted productivity of
individual divisions based on their industry, c oilKt , constructed as in Section V.A.4 and compute
our instrument for dispersion in productivity Sd_oil as the standard deviation of the predicted
division productivity for all divisions.
In Column (1), we ￿rst present the results from the ￿rst stage where we regress the dispersion of
division productivity Dispersion on the instrument. As can be observed the relationship is positive
strong and signi￿cant. In particular, a one standard deviation change in the instrument (0.21)
changes the dispersion among divisions by 0.3 standard deviations. This con￿rms our premise that
changes in oil prices explain changes in productivity dispersion of a conglomerate.
The results with the instrument are similar to those reported earlier. In Column (2) we
perform the baseline test of EV with the instrument while in Column (3) we conduct the analysis
with the changing credit market conditions. Similarly, Columns (4) and (5) perform tests using
Capex
Assets as the dependent variable. In these regressions we follow the control function approach (e.g.
Imbens and Newey [2009]) and include a control function of residuals from the ￿rst-stage (shown
in Column (1)). In particular, in Column (2) we ￿nd that diversi￿ed ￿rms with more diverse
investment opportunities have lower value as compared to a portfolio of comparable stand-alone
￿rms. And, Column (3) shows ￿as was the case in Table II ￿that there is also an increase in EV
during periods when TED is higher for conglomerates which have diverse investment opportunities
(coe¢ cient on Dispersion*TED is positive). Column (4) ￿nds that divisions inside conglomerates
with diverse investment opportunities have investments that are less sensitive to Q. In addition,
the investment to Q sensitivity is higher during high TED periods especially for conglomerates
with diverse investment opportunities (Column (5)). The economic magnitudes in these tests are




Table I: Descriptive Statistics  
  
The sample is by division and year (Compustat segment files, 1980-2006). Division cash flow is defined as operating profits of the division 
plus division depreciation. Division sales, assets, capital expenditure and cash flow are in millions of dollars. Industry Q of the division in a 
given year is the median Q of the stand-alone firms in the same industry. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of 
the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each 
division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994]. Capital investment is measured as capital expenditure 
normalized by assets. Diversity is defined as the standard deviation of the division-asset weighted (imputed) market-to-book ratio, divided 
by the equally weighted average (imputed) division maket-to-book (RSZ [2000]). Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of the 
division (imputed) market-to-book ratio for a diversified firm. 
 
                




Mean  SD 
 
Mean  SD 
Sales (mm$)  494  2873 
 
756  3723 
Assets (mm$)  768  7162 
 
1299  11661 
Capex (mm$)  45.9  371 
 
61.5  358 
Industry Q  2.71  3.61 
 
1.61  1.16 
Capex/Assets  0.072  0.095 
 
0.076  0.100 
Excess Value (EV) 
     
-0.108  0.514 
Diversity 
     
0.772  0.355 
Dispersion 
     
0.423  0.764 










Table II: Reduced Form Evidence  
Excess Value, Capital Investment, Dispersion in Divisional Productivity and External Market Conditions  
 
The sample is by division and year (Compustat segment files, 1980-2006). Division cash flow is defined as operating profits of the division 
plus division depreciation. Division sales, assets, capital expenditure and cash flow are in millions of dollars. Industry Q of the division in a 
given year is the median Q of the stand-alone firms in the same industry. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of 
the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each 
division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994]. Capital investment is measured as capital expenditure 
normalized by assets. Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of the division (imputed) market-to-book ratio for a diversified firm. 
Dummy(Diversified) is an indicator variable that takes a value 1 if the firm has more than one division. TED spread is the difference between the 
interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.   
   EV  Capex/Assets  Capex/Assets 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Q        0.0091***  0.0011***  0.0060***  0.0057*** 
         (0.0012)  (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Q*Dummy(Diversified)        -0.0073**   -0.0007**       
         (0.0035)  (0.0003)       
Q*Dummy(Diversified)*TED           0.0045***       
            (0.0004)       
Dispersion  -0.188***  -0.181***        0.0016***  0.0014*** 
   (0.007)  (0.004)        (0.0004)  (0 .0004) 
Dispersion*TED     0.0373****             
      (0.007)             
Q*Dispersion              -0.0007***  -0.0007*** 
               (0.0001)  (0 .0001) 
Q*Dispersion*TED                 0.0004*** 
                  (0.0001) 
Observations  47030  47030  263705  263705  145759  145759 
R-squared  0.633  0.64  0.409  0.57  0.594  0.61 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm/Division Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 34 
 
               
 
Table III: Structural Estimation: Main Results  
 
  
The sample is nonfinancial, unregulated firms from COMPUSTAT segment files from 1980 to 2006. In the first stage we recover the state 
transition function and the policy function for the diversified firms from the data. In the second stage we simulate the expected utility from 
different policy functions, and find the parameter that best satisfies the optimality condition. Both panels report the estimated structural 
parameters and the standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A reports the estimates using Q as a measure of productivity while while 
Panel B reports estimates with ROA as a measure of productivity.  
 
 
Panel A: Estimates using Q as a measure of productivity 
                                            
λ  φ0  φ1  φ2  c0  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  j0  j1 
0.757  2.689  1.085  0.050  -2.088  8.399  10.324  -85.989  0.689  -1.703  0.125  10.887  0.0001  0.297  25.367 
(0.0653)  (1.004)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (1.139)  (1.9152)  (5.4221)  (2.734)  (0.2727)  (0.1064)  (0.0861)  (0.2044)  (0.001)  (0.0541)  (2.358) 





Panel B: Estimates using ROA as a measure of productivity 
                                            
λ  φ0  φ1  φ2  c0  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  j0  j1 
0.686  8.721  0.003  0.0001  63.320  -165.052  86.166  -30.149  0.360  -0.995  0.619  0.032  0.0002  0.276  0.043 
(0.031)  (0.103)  (0.0001) (0.00001)  (0.998)  (1.440)  (0.763)  (0.761)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.00001)  (0.001)  (0.0001) 














Table IV: Out of Sample Test (Counterfactual) 
Excess Value and Capital Expenditures in Response to Crisis 
  
The table reports regressions based on the counterfactual exercise. Panel A presents results from data that uses estimates based only on the 
data from 1980 to 2006.We start with a random sample of conglomerate and stand alone firms in the end of 2007 and expose the firms in 
the sample to realized values of our shifter of capital market conditions, TED, for 2008, 2009 and 2010. TED spread is the difference 
between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government  T-bills.  We forward simulate our model (based on 
parameters in Table III) with simulations of productivity shocks from 2008 and shocks to TED from 2010 for 100 periods. The dependent 
variables used in the regressions are Excess Value (EV) and capital expenditure normalized by assets (Capex/Assets). Panel B uses the same 
dependent variables and presents results using actual data from Compustat segment files  for the period 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
Dummy(Diversified) is an indicator variable that takes a value 1 if the firm has more than one segment and High (Low) Dispersion are all 
diversified firms who have above (below) median value of Dispersion among all the diversified firms in the sample as of 2007.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Data from Forward Simulation 



















Year 4-6)    
High Dispersion  Low Dispersion 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Q 
 
-0.0011  0.231***  0.278***  0.181*** 
 
   
(0.0019)  (0.0187)  (0.0314)  (0.0199) 
  Q*Dummy(Diversified) 
 
0.232*** 
       
   
(0.00605) 
        Dispersion  0.0127** 
       
-0.112*** 
   (0.0051)              (0.015) 
Observations  792  5940  1584  824  760  792 
R-squared  0.052  0.410  0.111  0.148  0.094  0.044 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: Year 0 = 2007 





Panel B: Actual Data from Compustat (2007-2009) 
  
             EV  Capex/Assets  Capex/Assets  Capex/Assets  Capex/Assets 








Sample: Diversified Firms 
  
High Dispersion  Low Dispersion 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Q 
 
-0.00526***  -0.000946  -0.00117*  0.00164 
   




     
   
(0.00122) 
     
Q X Dummy(Year=08 or 09) 
   
0.00242**  0.00292***  -0.00597 
     
(0.00101)  (0.00103)  (0.00427) 
Dispersion  -0.105*** 
       
 
(0.0273) 
        Dispersion X Dummy(Year=08 or 09)  0.0530*** 
       
 
(0.0157) 
       
Dummy(Year=08 or 09)  0.0238* 
 
-0.0140***  -0.0147***  -0.00200 
   (0.0125)     (0.00241)  (0.00290)  (0.00698) 
Observations  5837  21408  11674  6677  4997 
R-squared  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             37 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Excess value of conglomerates with high productivity dispersion relative to those with low productivity dispersion  
  
The figure plots excess value of conglomerates with high productivity dispersion relative to those with low productivity dispersion values 
over time. We use TED spread as an indicator of credit market conditions. It measures the difference between the interest rates on 
interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of the ratio of firm 
value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each division of the 
conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994]. We sort the conglomerates into high and low productivity dispersion 
groups based on whether the standard deviation of productivity across the divisions of a firm is above or below sample median. We then 
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Figure 2: Out of Sample Test (Counterfactual) 
Excess Value and Capital Expenditure in Response to Crisis 
  
The figure reports values based on the counterfactual exercise. We start with a random sample of conglomerate and stand alone data in the 
end of 2007 and expose the firms in the sample to realized values of our shifter of capital market conditions. TED spread is the difference 
between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government  T-bills.  We forward simulate our model (based on 
parameters in Table III) with simulations of productivity shocks from 2008 and shocks to TED from 2010 for 100 periods. Excess Value 
(EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone 
firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz 
[1994]. Capital investment is measured as capital expenditure normalized by assets. All the estimates used in the forward simulation are 
based only on the data from 1980 to 2006. 
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Appendix Table A1: Reduced Form IV Evidence  
Excess Value, Capital Investment, Dispersion in Divisional Productivity and External Market Conditions  
 
The sample is by division and year (Compustat segment files, 1980-1998). Division cash flow is defined as operating profits of the division 
plus division depreciation. Division sales, assets, capital expenditure and cash flow are in millions of dollars. Industry Q of the division in a 
given year is the median Q of the stand-alone firms in the same industry. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of 
the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each 
division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994]. Capital investment (Capex/Assets) is measured as 
capital expenditure normalized by assets. In Columns (2) to (5) we follow the control function approach and include residuals from the 
first-stage (shown in Column (1)). Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of the division (imputed) market-to-book ratio for a 
diversified firm. Sd_Oil is constructed in two steps. In the first step we compute the sensitivity of two digit SIC industry Q to oil prices 
(real oil price per barrel in USD) over our sample period and assign the fitted productivity to individual divisions based on their industry. 
In the second step we compute Sd_Oil of the conglomerate in a given year as the standard deviation of the predicted division productivity, 
given oil prices. The IV is implemented using control functions in Columns (2) to (5). TED spread is the difference between the interest 
rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.    
  
         
 
Dispersion  EV  EV  Capex/Assets  Capex/Assets 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Sd_Oil  0.7824*** 
       
 
(0.0206) 
        Dispersion  
 
-0.1120***  -0.1190***  0.0406***  0.0399*** 
   
(0.0181)  (0.0212)  (0.0027)  (0.0023) 
Dispersion *TED 
   
0.0402**** 
   
     
(0.0143) 
    Q*Dispersion  
     
-0.0008****  -0.0009**** 
       
(0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Q*Dispersion *TED 
       
0.0005*** 
         
(0.0002) 
Observations  47030  47030  47030  145759  145759 
R-squared  0.384  0.651  0.656  0.595  0.596 
Other Controls (including control function) 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm/Division Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 